Multisender authentication codes allow a group of senders to construct an authenticated message for one receiver such that the receiver can verify authenticity of the received message. In this paper, we construct one multisender authentication code from pseudosymplectic geometry over finite fields. The parameters and the probabilities of deceptions of this code are also computed.
Introduction
Multisender authentication code was firstly constructed by Gilbert et al. in [1] in 1974. Multisender authentication system refers to a group of senders that cooperatively send a message to the receiver, and then the receiver should be able to ascertain that the message is authentic. About this case, many scholars had also much researches and had made great contributions to multisender authentication codes [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] .
In the actual computer network communications, multisender authentication codes include sequential model and simultaneous model. Sequential model is that each sender uses its own encoding message to the receiver, and the receiver receives the message and verifies whether the message is legal or not. Simultaneous model is that all senders use their own encoding rules to encode a source state, and each sender sends the encoded message to the synthesizer, respectively, and then the synthesizer forms an authenticated message and verifies whether the message is legal or not. In this paper, we will adopt the second model. In a simultaneous model, there are four participants: a group of senders = { 1 , 2 , . . . , }, the keys distribution center, he is responsible for the key distribution to senders and receiver, including solving the disputes between them, a receiver , a synthesizer, he only runs the trusted synthesis algorithm. The code works as follows: each sender and receiver has their own cartesian authentication code, respectively. Let ( , , ; ) ( = 1, 2, . . . , ) be the senders' cartesian authentication code, ( , , ; ) be the receiver's cartesian authentication code, ℎ : 1 × 2 × ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ × → the synthesis algorithm. : → is a subkey generation algorithm, where is the key set of the key distribution center. When authenticating a message, the senders and the receiver should comply with the protocol. The key distribution center randomly selects an encoding rule ∈ and sends = ( ) to the th sender ( = 1, 2, . . . , ) secretly, and then he calculates by according to an effective algorithm and secretly sends to the receiver ; if the senders would like to send a source state to the receiver , computes = ( , ) ( = 1, 2, . . . , ) and sends = ( , ) ( = 1, 2, . . . , ) to the synthesizer through an open channel; the synthesizer receives the message = ( , ) ( = 1, 2, . . . , ) and calculates = ℎ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) by the synthesis algorithm ℎ and then sends message = ( , ) to the receiver , he checks the authenticity by verifying whether = ( , ) or not. If the equality holds, the message is authentic and is accepted. Otherwise, the message is rejected.
We assume that the key distribution center is credible, though he know the senders' and receiver's encoding rules, he will not participate in any communication activities. When transmitters and receiver are disputing, the key distribution center settles it. At the same time, we assume that the system follows Kerckhoff's principle in which except for the actual used keys, the other information of the whole system is public.
In a multisender authentication system, we assume that the whole senders are cooperating to form a valid message; that is, all senders as a whole and receiver are reliable. But there are some malicious senders which they together cheat the receiver, the part of senders and receiver are not credible, they can take impersonation attack and substitution attack. In the whole system, we assume that { 1 , 2 , . . . , } are senders, is a receiver, is the encoding rules set of the sender , and is the decoding rules set of receiver . If the source state space and the key space of receiver are according to a uniform distribution, then the probability distribution of message space and tag space is determined by the probability distribution of and .
, . . . , }. Now, let us consider the attacks from malicious groups of senders. Here, there still are two kinds of attacks.
(i) The Opponent's Impersonation Attack. sends a message to receiver. is successful if the receiver accepts it as legitimate message. Denote ( ) as the largest probability of some opponent's successful impersonation attack, and it can be expressed as
(ii) The Opponent's Substitution Attack. It is the largest probability of some opponent's successful substitution attack, and it can be expressed as
In this paper, we give a construction about multisender authentication code from pseudosymplectic geometry over finite fields.
Pseudosymplectic Geometry
Let be the finite field with elements, where is a power of 2, = 2] + , and = 1, 2. Let
and is a (2] + ) × (2] + ) nonalternate symmetric matrix. The pseudosymplectic group of degree (2] + ) over is defined to be the set of matrices 2]+ ( ) = { | = } denoted by 2]+ ( ). 
The vector space (2] + ) together with this group action is called the pseudosymplectic space over the finite field of characteristic 2.
Let be an -dimensional subspace of (2]+ ) ; then, is cogredient to one of the following three normal forms:
) ,
for some such that 0 ≤ ≤ [ /2]. We say that is a subspace of type ( , 2 + , , ), where = 0, 1, or 2 and = 0 or 1, if
Let be an -dimensional subspace of (2]+ ) . Denote by ⊥ the set of vectors which are orthogonal to every vector of ; that is,
Obviously,
More properties of pseudosymplectic geometry over finite fields can be found in [7] .
In [2] , Desmedt et al. gave two constructions for MRAcodes based on polynomials and finite geometries, respectively. There are other constructions of multisender authentication codes which are given in [3] [4] [5] [6] . The construction of authentication codes is of combinational design in its nature. We know that the geometry of classical groups over finite fields, including symplectic geometry, pseudosymplectic geometry, unitary geometry, and orthogonal geometry, can provide a better combination of structure and can be easy to count. In this paper, we construct one multisender authentication code from pseudosymplectic geometry over finite fields. The parameters and the probabilities of deceptions of Journal of Applied Mathematics 3 this code are also computed. We realize the generalization and application of the similar idea and method of article [8] from symplectic geometry to pseudosymplectic geometry over finite fields.
Construction
Let F be a finite field with elements and (1 ≤ ≤ 2] + 2) the row vector in F (2]+2) whose th coordinate is 1 and all other coordinates are 0. Assume that 2 <
and then The decoding map : × → , ( , ) = + . The synthesizing map ℎ :
where is a nonsingular matrix and ( 1 + 2 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ) is a subspace of type (2 + 1, 2 , , 1).
The code works as follows.
(1) Key Distribution. The key distribution center randomly chooses an ∈ and selects a (2 , ) subspace such that ⊂ , and it selects ∈ so that 1 + 2 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + = , and is a nonsingular matrix satisfying = ⟨ , ⟩. The key distribution center randomly secretly sends , to the receiver and the senders, respectively, and sends to the synthesizer.
(2) Broadcast. If the senders want to send a source state ∈ to the receiver , the sender calculates = ( , ) = + then sends (1 ≤ ≤ ) to the synthesizer. 
then, 
Obviously, ̸ ⊂ ⊥ . So, is a subspace of type (2 − +2, 2( − + 1), − + 1, 1) satisfying ⊂ ⊂ ⊥ ; that is, ∈ . Furthermore, we know that
Conversely, for any ∈ , let = ∩ ⊥ , ⊂ , satisfying 
Obviously, 
For being a subspace of type (2 − +2, 2( − +1), − +1, 1), then ∩ ⊥ is a subspace of type (2 − + 1, 2( − ), − , 1); that is, ∈ . Choose
Let = + ; then, ∈ , and ⊕ = ⊕ . Therefore, is a surjection. For any ∈ , ∈ , if there exist ∈ so that = + ; then, ∈ ∩ ⊥ . However, dim = 2 − +1 = dim ( ∩ ⊥ ), and so = ∩ ⊥ ; that is, is determined by and . 
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Obviously, for any V ∈ and V ̸ = 0, V ∉ ; therefore, 
From the above mentioned, is a subspace of type (2 + 1, 2 , , 1) and ⊂ ; that is, ∈ .
(2) For ∈ , is a subspace of type (2 + 1, 2 , , 1) and ⊂ ; so, there is a subspace ⊂ , satisfying
Then, we can assume that ) ,
for is a subspace of type (2 − + 1, 2( − ), − , 1) and ⊂ ⊂ ⊥ ; that is, ∈ is a source state. For any V ∈ and V ̸ = 0, V ∉ is obvious; that is, ∩ ⊥ = {0}. Therefore,
) = . Let = ( ); then, is receiver's decoding rule satisfying = + .
If is another source state contained in , then ⊂ ⊂ ⊥ . Therefore, ⊂ ∩ ⊥ = , while dim = dim , and so = ; that is, is the uniquely source state contained in . From Lemmas 1 and 2, we know that such construction of multisender authentication codes is reasonable, and there are senders in this system. Next, we compute the parameters of this code and the maximum probability of success in impersonation attack and substitution attack by group of senders. For any ∈ , we can assume that has the following form: 
twocolumngrid If ⊂ , then we assume that 
from ⊥ , we know that 7 = 1, where 9 , 11 arbitrarily, and therefore the number of containing is − +1 (1 ≤ ≤ ).
(2) We know that every contains only one source state ∩ ⊥ and the number of containing . Therefore, we have
Lemma 5. (1) The number of the receiver's decoding rules is
For any ∈ , the number of which contained is ( − +1) (1 ≤ ≤ ). Proof. (1) Let ∈ ; has the following form:
For being a subspace of type (2 , 2 , , 0), so 2 and 6 = 0; 4 , 5 arbitrarily. Therefore, 
where 5 and 7 arbitrarily. Therefore, the number of which contained is ( − +1) . 
where 6 , 7 arbitrarily. Therefore, the number of containing is (]− +1)( − ) .
Lemma 7.
For any ∈ and = { 1 , 2 , . . . , } ∈ , the number of which contained in and containing is ( − +1)( − ) .
Proof. For any ∈ , we assume to be as follows: 
where 7 and 9 arbitrarily. Therefore, the number of which contained in and containing is ( − +1)( − ) . 
From the above mentioned, we know that 1 ∩ 2 = 0 + , and then dim 
where every row of (0 7 0 9 0)
is the linear combination of the base of 
Therefore, the number of ⊂ 1 ∩ 2 and containing is ( − )( − ) . 
respectively.
Proof. Impersonation Attack. , after receiving his secret keys, encodes a message and sends it to receiver. is successful if the receiver accepts it as legitimate message. So, .
